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TO SHIELD AND PROTECT:1 THE COMPETENCE
TO STAND TRIAL DOCTRINE IN NEW MEXICO
By Lea A. Zukowski*

INTRODUCTION
Decades before the United States Supreme Court articulated the rule for
determining whether a defendant is competent2 to stand trial in Dusky v. United
States,3 the territory of New Mexico recognized the right,4 creating the foundation
for future development of the competency doctrine in this state. Since 1910, the
doctrine has continued to develop in case law and in revisions to statutes and
procedural rules. Although the competency requirement is rooted in notions of
fairness and due process, a defendant who raises competency in New Mexico often
faces a cruel irony: an extended deprivation of liberty without the benefit of a trial.5
This article will trace the development of the doctrine in New Mexico, analyze the
current statute and rule, and provide a critique of the proposed revisions to the rules
for competency determinations, keeping in mind the specific goal of reducing the
length of pretrial detention for defendants who raise competency.

* Staff Attorney at Disability Rights New Mexico and a graduate of the University of New Mexico
School of Law. The views expressed here are my own. My appreciation to my daughter who inspires me
every day.
1. State v. Upton, 1955-NMSC-087, ¶ 14, 290 P.2d 440 (“Our statute . . . shields and protects
persons who are insane.”); but see ROBERT J. TORREZ, MYTH OF THE HANGING TREE: STORIES OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN TERRITORIAL NEW MEXICO 158 (2008) (noting that John Upton was found to be
competent and he was executed on Feb. 24, 1956).
2. The terms competence, competency, and competent are used interchangeably in this article and
all refer to the legal concept of being competent to stand trial. Competency to stand trial also includes
competency at other stages of the proceeding including plea negotiation and sentencing.
3. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (articulating the still controlling formulation
that the determination of competence to stand trial depends upon “whether [the defendant] has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”).
4. Territory v. Kennedy, 1910-NMSC-047, ¶ 6, 110 P. 854 (documenting the Supreme Court of the
Territory of New Mexico affirming the trial judge’s statement that “the law did not tolerate the trial of an
insane person, and if he was then insane the trial could proceed no further at that time”).
5. LINDA FREEMAN, ALEX ADAMS & AMIR CHAPEL, N.M. SENT’G COMM’N, EFFECT OF MENTAL
HEALTH DIAGNOSES ON LENGTH OF STAY IN TWO NEW MEXICO DETENTION FACILITIES, 2–3 (2013)
(reporting that when all other variables were held constant, having a competency or diagnostic evaluation
resulted in a longer length of stay than for arrestees who did not require such evaluation and that only
being charged with a violent felony resulted in longer pretrial detention).
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BACKGROUND
The right of a criminal defendant not to be tried while incompetent is a
fundamental concept in criminal law.6 The prohibition against punishing a defendant
who lacks the ability to understand the charges against him and the consequences of
a trial dates back to at least mid-seventeenth-century England.7 The competency
doctrine is related to several constitutional protections including the due process
clause, the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to a fair trial, and the right of
the accused to testify and to confront accusers.
The competency requirement stems from the right of criminal defendants
to be present during trial8 since a defendant who is physically or mentally absent
cannot adequately defend against a criminal charge.9 The right to be competent to
stand trial protects the adversarial process10 and helps insure the integrity of the
proceedings by increasing reliability, protecting the right to a fair trial with evenly
matched adversaries, and preserving the legitimacy of the system.11
Competence to stand trial is distinct from other legal questions about the
mental faculties of defendants. Though the terms “insanity” or “insane” are used in
older case law to describe what we now refer to as incompetence, today these are
distinct legal concepts. Insanity is an affirmative defense to criminal charges when

6. See David W. Beaudreau, Due Process or “Some Process”? Restoring Pate v Robinson’s
Guarantee of Adequate Competency Procedures, 47 CAL. W. L. REV.369, 375 (2011) (“[M]odern courts
have determined this right plays an essential role in the criminal justice system.”); Michael L. Perlin, “For
the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants
with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 198 (2000) (“Few principles are as firmly embedded in
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence as the doctrine that an incompetent defendant may not be put to
trial.”).
7. See, e.g., J. Amy Dillard, Without Limitation: “Groundhog Day” for Incompetent Defendants,
56 DEPAUL L. REV.1221, 1225 (2007) (“The notion that a criminal defendant must be competent before
standing trial dates as far back as medieval English law.”); Grant H. Morris et al., Competency to Stand
Trial on Trial, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 193, 201 (2004) (reporting that Medieval English law
allowed torture of defendants who refused to enter a plea, but a person who was mute due to mental or
physical defects was not tortured); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (citing II WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *24 (William C. Jones ed., Bancroft Whitney
Company 1916) to establish the history of the competence requirement in the common law tradition).
8. See Beaudreau, supra note 6, at 375 (“This right shares its conceptual footing with the right not
to be tried in absentia.”); Louis B. Schlesinger, A Case Study Involving Competency to Stand Trial:
Incompetent Defendant, Incompetent Examiner, of “Malingering by Proxy”?, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 381, 381 (2003) (“The law on competency to stand trial . . . stems from the prohibition against trial in
absentia.”).
9. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (“The mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present in
the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself.”) (citing Caleb Foote, A Comment
on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960)).
10. See id. at 171–72 (“[I]t suffices to note that the prohibition [against trying an incompetent
defendant] is fundamental to an adversary system of justice.”); see generally Note, Incompetency to Stand
Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454 (1967) (describing the importance of having fair and reasonable procedures
for making competency determinations).
11. RISDON N. SLATE, ET AL., THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS: CRISIS AND
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 302 (Carolina Acad. Press, 2nd ed. 2013); see also Note, supra
note 10, at 458 (“The adversary form of the criminal proceedings necessarily rests on the assumption that
the defendant will be a conscious and intelligent participant; the trial of a defendant who cannot fulfill this
expectation appears inappropriate and irrational.”).
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the defendant suffered from diminished mental function at the time of the
commission of the crime.12 Competence, by contrast, refers to whether a defendant
has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding” and have “a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.”13 Incompetence is also different from incapacity.
Incapacity is a legal concept that applies in the context of probate issues and refers
to determining whether a person has the ability to manage personal or financial
affairs.14
The presence of mental illness, intellectual disability,15 traumatic brain
injury, or physical illnesses that affect mental functioning do not automatically mean
a defendant is not competent to stand trial,16 because a person with these disabilities
may meet the legal standard for competence.17 “While there is certainly an overlap
between mental disorders and legal competency, a person afflicted with a mental
disorder may be found legally competent.”18 For example, many people in jails are
mentally ill,19 but not all of them will be found incompetent to stand trial.20 A finding

12. State v. Najar, 1986-NMCA-068, ¶ 8, 724 P.2d 249 (“A claim of incompetency to stand trial is
distinct from both the defense of insanity and the defense of lack of capacity to form a specific intent . . .
The competency issue is whether a defendant understands the nature and significance of the proceedings,
has a factual understanding of the charges, and is able to assist his attorney in his defense . . . . The insanity
defense concerns a defendant’s mental state at the time the offense was committed and is governed by its
own procedural rules.”); see also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, 159 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1989) (stating that “[t]he defense of . . . [insanity] is an affirmative defense to criminal charges
that . . . negates the culpability requisite to a finding of guilt”).
13. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
14. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-101 (2011) (defining terms used in determining if a person is
incapacitated and requires a guardian or conservator).
15. Even though New Mexico’s statutes use the term “mental retardation,” it will not be used in this
article unless part of a direct quote. This outdated and derogatory term has widely been replaced by the
terms “developmentally disabled” or “intellectually disabled.” See State v. Linares, 2017-NMSC-014, ¶ 1,
n.1, 393 P.3d 691.
16. N.M. STAT. ANN § 43-1-5 (1977) (“Neither the fact that a person has been accepted at or admitted
to a hospital or institutional facility, nor the receiving of mental health or developmental disability
treatment services, shall constitute a sufficient basis for a finding of incompetence.”); Linares, 2017NMSC-014, ¶ 33 (“A defendant may be incompetent to stand trial due to mental retardation; however,
mental retardation, in and of itself, is not conclusive evidence that a defendants is not competent.”)
(citations omitted); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, 175 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989)
(“[D]efendants may not be mentally ill yet may be incompetent to stand trial.”); see also SLATE ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 301.
17. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (1960) (defining competency as whether the defendant has “sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and have “a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”).
18. LINDA FREEMAN, AMIR CHAPEL & MATTHEW MALAN, N.M. SENT’G COMM’N, EFFECT OF
COMPETENCY AND DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION ON LENGTH OF STAY IN A SAMPLE OF NEW MEXICO
DETENTION FACILITIES 1 (2013).
19. SLATE ET AL., supra note 11, at 228 (finding prevalence rates of mental illness among those in
jail to range from 6 percent to 64 percent depending upon the methodology used).
20. SLATE ET AL., supra note 11, at 317 (finding that between 20 and 30 percent of defendants
referred for evaluations are found to be incompetent to stand trial); Mental Competency in the Court,
MENTALCOMPETENCY.ORG, http://www.mentalcompetency.org/mental-competency-in-the-court-room/
(last visited October 19, 2017) (“An estimated 60,000 competency evaluations are court-ordered each
year. Approximately 20 percent of these evaluations lead to findings of incompetence.”).
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of incompetence is not a get-out-of-jail-free card; many defendants who are initially
found incompetent later become competent to stand trial through successful
treatment or rehabilitation efforts,21 and defendants who are unlikely to become
competent and are dangerous are subject to commitment.22
Though the United States common law has long recognized that prosecuting
or convicting a defendant who is not competent to stand trial is a violation of due
process,23 it was not until 1960 that the United States Supreme Court provided the
current test for determining competence to stand trial in Dusky v. United States.24
The determination of competence depends upon “whether [the defendant] has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding–and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.”25 This standard is the minimum inquiry that due
process requires.26 The Dusky standard has been adopted by all of the states as the
baseline for determining competence to stand trial.27
A few years after deciding Dusky, the Court in Pate v. Robinson28 affirmed
the constitutional right of defendants to be competent during trial.29 Defendant
Robinson’s attorney raised the issue of his competency during trial,30 but did not
formally move for determination of the issue.31 Multiple witnesses provided
uncontradicted testimony about Robinson’s history of mental illness and irrational
behavior.32 The trial court found Robinson to be mentally alert and able to understand
21. See SLATE ET AL., supra note 11, at 301. (“Across studies, it is found that around 75 percent . . .
and as many as 95 percent . . . of incompetent defendants are restored to competence within approximately
6 months.”); see also James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 459 (1985) (regarding restoration of competence for intellectually impaired
defendants).
22. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-1 to -2 (1993) (describing commitment procedures for a defendant
who is not competent and is determined to be dangerous); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1-1 to -25 (1999)
(describing commitment procedures for defendants with mental health and developmental disabilities);
see also State v. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 2–11, 923 P.2d 1131 (describing the confinement of
defendants who have been found incompetent to stand trial).
23. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (“[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is
legally incompetent violates due process . . . .”) (citing Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956));
Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899) (“It is fundamental that an insane person can
neither plead to an arraignment, be subjected to a trial, or, after trial, receive judgment, or, after judgment,
undergo punishment.”); United States v. Chisholm, 149 F. 284, 289 (S.D. Ala. 1906) (“[T]he mental
impairment of [a] prisoner’s mind . . . disable[s] him . . . from fairly presenting his defense.”).
24. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
25. Id.
26. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993) (“While states are free to adopt competency
standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose
these additional requirements.”).
27. See Grant H. Morris et al., Competence to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &POL’Y
193, 208 (2004) (“[S]tate courts in interpreting their states’ competency statutes have quoted the Dusky
language verbatim, accepting the Dusky standard as the required standard for competency.”).
28. Pate, 383 U.S. at 386.
29. Id. at 377 (“We have concluded that Robinson was constitutionally entitled to a hearing on the
issue of his competence to stand trial.”).
30. Id. at 376.
31. Id. at 384.
32. Id. at 378.
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the proceedings as evidenced by his interactions with the trial judge, and thus ignored
the testimony about Robinson’s history of instability.33 The United States Supreme
Court ruled that Robinson was entitled to a new trial, finding a violation of his due
process rights when the trial court failed to determine competency.34 The Court
stated, “While Robinson’s demeanor at trial might be relevant to the ultimate
decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on that
very issue.”35 The Court held that the evidence of Robinson’s history of mental
illness raised a sufficient doubt as to his present competency, and thus the lower court
was required to determine the issue.36
Nearly a decade later, the United States Supreme Court in Drope v.
Missouri37 further clarified the competency doctrine established by Dusky and Pate.
In Drope, the defendant’s attorney filed a pretrial motion requesting a competency
evaluation.38 A report from Drope’s examining psychiatrist was attached to the
motion.39 Drope’s wife testified that he was “sick and needed psychiatric care.”40
Furthermore, Drope attempted to kill himself during the trial and could not attend
the proceedings.41 The trial continued despite Drope’s physical absence and
questionable competence.42 Drope was convicted.43 The Supreme Court vacated the
conviction because “the correct course was to suspend the trial until such an
evaluation could be made.”44
The Court in Drope reaffirmed the Dusky standard45 and notably added to
the doctrine by emphasizing the trial court’s responsibility to be aware of
competency issues.46 The Court stated, “Even when a defendant is competent at the
commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances
suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of
competence to stand trial.”47 Thus, after Drope, trial courts must exercise a level of
vigilance that goes beyond just responding to motions made by the attorneys, and

33. Id. at 385–386.
34. Id. at 385 (“The court’s failure to make such inquiry thus deprived Robinson of his constitutional
right to a fair trial.”).
35. Id. at 386.
36. Id. at 387 (“In the event a sufficient doubt exists as to his present competence such a hearing must
be held.”).
37. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
38. Id. at 164.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 166.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 166–167.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 181.
45. Id. at 171 (“It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks
the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel,
and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to trial.”).
46. Id. at 181.
47. Id.
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trial courts are required to consider competency when it arises at any stage of a
criminal proceeding and not just before trial.48
PART I: THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPETENCY ISSUES IN NEW
MEXICO
The determination of competence to stand trial has been called “the single
most important issue in the criminal mental health field”49 and it is also one of the
most controversial topics in the legal field.50 The issue of competence is particularly
relevant in New Mexico because delays caused in part by confusion about the
procedure to determine competency contribute to extensive pretrial detention of
potentially incompetent defendants.51
In the most recent surveys of pretrial length of stay in New Mexico jails,
the New Mexico Sentencing Commission found that competency evaluations are
correlated with disproportionately extended length of stay in New Mexico detention
centers.52 Compared to arrestees who do not have a competency proceeding,
arrestees who are found competent have a median length of stay 2.3 times longer,
and arrestees who are found not competent have a median length of stay 3.8 times
longer.53 Out of all the variables that affect length of stay, only being charged with a
violent felony had a greater impact on length of stay than having a competency
evaluation.54
One way New Mexico could decrease the length of time potentially
incompetent defendants languish in jail before trial is to reduce the amount of time
it takes to make the determination of competency. As found by the Sentencing
Commission, pretrial length of stay is significantly extended for arrestees who raise
competency,55 which is in part due to the complexity of the current procedure. The
48. Id. at 163 (“the information . . . created sufficient doubt of [Drope’s] competence to stand trial to
require further inquiry on the question”); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966) (“good faith doubt”).
49. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-4.1 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N
1989); see also ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 200 (1975)
(stating that determination of competence is “the most significant mental health inquiry pursued in the
system of criminal law”).
50. See Nicholas Rosinia, Note, How ‘Reasonable’ has Become Unreasonable: A Proposal for
Rewriting the Lasting Legacy of Jackson v. Indiana, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 673, 673 (2012)
(“[C]ompetency to stand trial is one of the most widely debated concepts in criminal jurisprudence.”).
51. See generally LINDA FREEMAN, N.M. SENT’G COMM’N, LENGTH OF STAY IN DETENTION
FACILITIES: A PROFILE OF SEVEN NEW MEXICO COUNTIES (2012); FREEMAN, ADAMS & CHAPEL, supra
note 5; FREEMAN, CHAPEL & MALAN, supra note 18.
52. See, e.g., FREEMAN, CHAPEL, & MALAN, supra note 18, at 1 (concluding that “arrestees with
competency proceedings had a longer median length of stay in jail”).
53. FREEMAN, CHAPEL & MALAN, supra note 18, at 4.
54. FREEMAN, ADAMS & CHAPEL, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that when all other variables were held
constant, being charged with a violent felony resulted in a stay of 286 days longer than those not charged
with a violent felony. Having a competency or a diagnostic evaluation resulted in stay of 162.6 days longer
than for those who did not require such evaluation).
55. See, e.g., State v. Linares, 2017-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 3–20, 393 P.3d 691 (describing pretrial
incarceration of over three years between indictment and eventual finding of incompetence to stand trial);
State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 23, 366 P.3d 1121(describing four years and three months of pretrial
incarceration in protective custody with delay in part due to competency being raised); State v. Stock,
2006-NMCA-140, ¶¶ 2–9,147 P.3d 885 (describing pretrial incarceration for three years with delay in part
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rule must be simplified to assure that the procedure is fair and timely, and that the
goals of the criminal justice system to prevent and deter criminal behavior are met.
PART II: NEW MEXICO’S CURRENT STATUTE AND PROCEDURE
FOR DETERMINING COMPETENCY
A. The statute: Mental Illness and Competency, NMSA §§ 31-9-1 to 31-9-2
The statute prescribes the procedure related to competency to stand trial,
from raising the issue to commitment and treatment when a defendant is found not
competent.56 As the New Mexico Court of Appeals aptly recognized, “Our
Legislature built the due process alert into New Mexico law. It did not mince words
in broadly stating that ‘[w]henever it appears that there is a question as to the
defendant’s competency to proceed in a criminal case, any further proceeding in the
cause shall be suspended until the issue is determined.’”57 NMSA 31-9-2 provides,
“Upon motion of any defendant, the court shall order a mental examination of the
defendant before making any determination of competency . . . .” Thus, New
Mexico’s statutory requirement is only a question as to competency without
requiring a specific burden of proof. Section 31-9-1.1 requires an examination upon
a motion for evaluation of competency, a professional evaluation,58 and a hearing
after the evaluation is completed.59 Section 31-9-1 requires suspension of the
proceedings whenever competence is raised until the issue has been determined.60
B. The Rule: NMRA 5-602
Section B of the current rule sets forth the procedure trial courts must follow
when competency is raised. The relevant parts to this discussion read:
(1) The issue of the defendant’s competency to stand trial may be
raised by motion, or upon the court’s own motion, at any stage of
the proceedings.
(2) The issue of the defendant’s competency to stand trial shall be
determined by the judge, unless the judge finds there is evidence
which raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s competency
to stand trial.
(a) If a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s competency to stand
trial is raised prior to trial, the court shall order the defendant to be
evaluated as provided by law. . . . 61

due to competency being raised); State v. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135, ¶¶ 3–7, 124 P.3d 1175 (describing
over three years of incarceration that included treatment to competency at the state hospital).
56. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-1 to -2 (1993).
57. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135, ¶ 17 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1).
58. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1.1 (directing that “[t]he defendant’s competence shall be professionally
evaluated by a . . . qualified professional recognized by the district court as an expert and a report shall be
submitted as ordered by the court”).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 31-9-1.
61. Rule 5-602(B) NMRA.
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Section C is titled “Mental examination” and provides: “Upon motion and
upon good cause shown, the court shall order a mental examination of the defendant
before making any determination of competency under this rule.”62
The rule identifies two different burdens of proof needed to trigger an
evaluation of competency. First the rule requires a “reasonable doubt” as to the
defendant’s competency if the issue is raised prior to trial.63 According to the rule, if
the judge does not find evidence that raises a reasonable doubt as to competency, a
professional evaluation does not need to occur.64 Second, the rule requires a motion
and “good cause shown” to order an evaluation.65 This discrepancy seems to mean
that if the issue is raised by a motion, good cause must be shown, but if the issue is
raised prior to trial, presumably with or without a motion, there must be a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant’s competency. The rule does not specify when and if a
hearing is required after an evaluation is completed. Lastly, the rule requires that
proceedings be stayed only if a defendant is found to be incompetent and not while
the issue is being determined.66
PART III: NEW MEXICO CASE LAW RELATED TO COMPETENCE TO
STAND TRIAL
A. Foundational cases
1. Territory v. Kennedy67
The events underlying the Kennedy case occurred in 1910 when New
Mexico was still a territory. James Kennedy was the cook for a group driving cattle.68
One day he did not bring the water along from the previous camp site.69 His
employer, Francis Evans felt he was “obligated to reprimand Kennedy . . . or as he
expressed it, ‘jack him up pretty sharp’”70 before sending Kennedy back for the
water.71 Sometime in the middle of the night, another member of the party awoke to
see Kennedy strike Evans three times with an ax, killing him.72 Despite mounting a
defense of insanity at the time of the crime and the judge acknowledging that
Kennedy might not be competent at the time of trial,73 Kennedy was convicted of the

62. Rule 5-602(C) NMRA.
63. Rule 5-602(B)(2)(a) NMRA.
64. Rule 5-602(B) NMRA.
65. Rule 5-602(C) NMRA.
66. Rule 5-602(B)(3)(a) NMRA.
67. Territory v. Kennedy, 1910-NMSC-047, 110 P. 854. Note that in this case “the defense of
insanity” is used as the term is used today, but “insanity at the time of trial” is the same as the term
“competence to stand trial” today.
68. Id. ¶ 4.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. ¶ 6 (noting that testimony regarding Kennedy’s present competence was offered and that the
judge told the jury that “the law did not tolerate the trial of an insane person”).
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murder.74 He appealed the conviction, and the New Mexico Supreme court remanded
the case.75
Several points made by the Supreme Court in Kennedy have continued
relevance. First, the Court demonstrated New Mexico’s recognition of the right of a
defendant to be competent to stand trial.76 Second, the Court established that
incompetence at the time of trial is not a basis for acquittal when the Court found
that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider acquittal on the basis of
present competence, stating, “Insanity at the time of the trial alone is not a ground of
acquittal, and should not have been submitted to the jury as such ground in this
case.”77 The opinion also distinguishes insanity at the time of the crime from present
inability to competently participate in the trial.78
Perhaps the most enduring and important aspect of the Kennedy decision is
the right of the defendant to have the issue of his present competence decided by a
jury rather than the court when the issue is raised during trial.79 Because Kennedy
was decided before New Mexico enacted its Constitution, which guarantees the right
to a jury “as it has heretofore existed,” this right cannot be denied to criminal
defendants.80 The issue of when a jury rather than the court should decide
competence is a theme that arises throughout the development of the doctrine.81
2. In re Smith82
Along with Kennedy, In re Smith laid the foundation for the competence
doctrine in New Mexico. It provides an interesting story that reveals another theme
in the development of the doctrine that persists to this day—the concern that the
claim of incompetence is subject to abuse by a clever defendant.

74. Id.
75. Id. ¶ 22. Information about the case after remand is not available, but there is no record of
Kennedy being executed.
76. Id. ¶ 6 (“That led the trial judge to state, in the presence of the jury, in substance that the law did
not tolerate the trial of an insane person, and if he was then insane the trial could proceed no further at
that time.”).
77. Id. ¶ 19 (noting further that this instruction “is not an error of which the defendant could complain,
since it gave him a chance of acquittal to which he was not entitled”).
78. Id.
79. Id. ¶ 7 (“The course which the trial court pursued in submitting to the jury, with the other issues
in the case, the question whether the defendant was then insane, is, we think, required by our statute
(section 1929, Comp. Laws 1897), when the question is first raised after the trial has begun.”).
80. See State v. Chavez, 1975-NMCA-119, ¶¶ 13–17, 541 P.2d 631 (finding the statute that allowed
the issue to be decided without a jury unconstitutional under the New Mexico Constitution in part because
Kennedy demonstrated the right to have a jury decide present competency when the issue is raised during
trial).
81. See, e.g., State v. Sena, 1979-NMCA-043, ¶ 4, 594 P.2d 336 (distinguishing competency to stand
trial from competency to be sentenced, and finding the court, without a jury, can determine competency
when the issue is raised after trial); Hoffman v. State, 1968-NMCA-028, ¶ 15, 441 P.2d 226 (finding the
defendant was entitled to have the issue of competence submitted to a jury); State v. Folk, 1952-NMSC079, ¶ 8, 247 P.2d 165 (discussing the procedure followed by the court in Kennedy when the issue arose
during trial).
82. In re Smith, 1918-NMSC-129, 176 P. 819. Note this case also uses the phrase “insane at time of
trial” the same way “competent at the time of trial” is used today.
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On February 20, 1916, A.B. Smith, alias W.F. Dashley, escaped from the
Luna County jail in Deming, New Mexico along with four other prisoners.83 Smith,
the alleged leader of the group,84 had been in the jail on forgery charges.85 The group
drove away in a stolen car and was found by a sheriff’s posse later that day near
Rincon, New Mexico.86 During the confrontation, shots were fired, and Sherriff
Dwight Stevens was killed.87 All of the escaped prisoners were caught within days88
except for Smith, who eluded police for months.89 Smith was eventually captured in
Reno, Nevada on August 25, 1916, when he was again attempting to commit
forgery.90 Upon capture, Smith reported that he had gone from Deming to
Albuquerque, then to California.91 He was brought back to New Mexico to face
charges.92 Smith was tried for murder and convicted.93 He then appealed, and his
conviction was affirmed on July 15, 1918.94
On July 15, 1918, Smith’s execution by hanging was scheduled to occur on
August 13, 1918.95 Smith was granted a reprieve by the governor until October 25,
1918, and he was moved to the state penitentiary in Santa Fe “for safe keeping.”96
On August 10, 1918, a writ de lunatic inquiriendo was issued by the district court of
Santa Fe.97 Smith was deemed by the district court “to be of unsound mind.”98 On
this basis, Smith petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court to stay his execution
until he could be “restored to reason.”99
The Court found that the writ and the proceeding in the district court
pertained only to the protection of civil and property interests of people who were
found to be insane, and the finding of an “unsound mind” for that purpose did not
apply to competency in a criminal proceeding.100 However, and of enduring
importance, the Court decided that when the question of competency at the time of
trial arises, the common law and humanity require an inquiry on the matter.101 The

83. State v. Starr, 1917-NMSC-092, ¶ 1, 173 P. 674.
84. Jail Breaker Caught at Reno: Man Believed to Have Led Deming Jail Break to be Taken to Las
Cruces, EL PASO HERALD, Aug. 28, 1916, at 8, [hereinafter Jail Breaker] http://texashistory.unt.edu/
ark:/67531/metapth138415/m1/8/zoom/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
85. Kevin Buey, Headstone restored for Luna County sheriff killed in 1916, THE DEMING
HEADLIGHT, June 11, 2008 12:00 AM (on file with author).
86. Starr, 1917-NMSC-092, ¶ 1.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. State v. Smith, 1918-NMSC-090, ¶ 2, 174 P. 740.
90. Jail Breaker, supra note 84.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Smith, 1918-NMSC-090, ¶ 1.
94. Id. ¶ 11.
95. In re Smith, 1918-NMSC-129, ¶ 1, 176 P. 819.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 8.
101. Id. ¶¶ 12–15 (“[T]he common law forbids the trial, sentencing, or execution of an insane person
for a crime while he continues in that state . . . the judgment of the district court of Santa Fé county, filed
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Court considered the evidence of Smith’s mental state during trial to determine
whether to stay his execution. Ultimately the Court did not stay the sentence, finding
“that Smith is sane, and that he has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of
the proceedings against him and his impending fate and execution, and that he
understands, knows, and is able to allege any fact which might exist tending to show
that he should not be executed.”102
Given Smith’s reputation as the leader of the gang who escaped jail103 and
his being the only one of five escapees to elude capture,104 he had a heavy burden to
persuade the Court of his incompetence. Smith mounted what appears to be a
formidable amount of evidence in his attempt to persuade the Court to stay his
sentence.105 He had a parade of witnesses and was represented by a reputable
lawyer.106 The Court documented the details of the evidence, but unlike the district
court, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by Smith’s presentation.107
It appears that Smith may have prevailed in the end: there is no evidence
that either Smith or his accomplice Starr was ever executed,108 and New Mexico has
the benefit of his case to guide the competency doctrine. In re Smith established that
competency can be raised at any time and courts are required to make an inquiry
anytime the issue arises, but a jury is only required to decide the issue if it is raised
during trial and not at any another phase of the proceedings.109

in this court as stated, was a sufficient suggestion to the court that the question of the sanity or insanity of
the petitioner should be investigated as a matter of humanity.”).
102. Id. ¶ 36.
103. Jail Breaker, supra note 85.
104. See In re Smith, 1918-NMSC-129, ¶ 1.
105. See id. ¶¶ 25–35.
106. Id. (detailing all of the evidence presented by Smith, which included testimony from his sister,
several doctors, and employees of the penitentiary). Smith’s lawyer, A.M. Edwards, was probably the
future assistant district attorney and state senator.
107. Id. ¶¶ 1, 37.
108. See Buey, supra note 85 (reporting that murdered sheriff Stephen’s grandson was told the
perpetrators were sentenced to life in prison); Mark Allen, Possible Legal Executions, RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS, http://www.angelo.edu/services/library/librarians/mallan/rip.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2017);
TORREZ, supra note 1, at 23, 30 (noting that Governor’s pardons and prison escapes were common reasons
that executions were not always carried out).
109. In re Smith, 1918-NMSC-129, ¶¶ 12–15 (“[T]he common law forbids the trial, sentencing, or
execution of an insane person for a crime while he continues in that state . . . the judgment of the district
court of Santa Fé county, filed in this court as stated, was a sufficient suggestion to the court that the
question of the sanity or insanity of the petitioner should be investigated as a matter of humanity.”); see
also State v. Sena, 1979-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 4, 21, 594 P.2d 336 (noting that competence to stand trial and
competence to be sentenced are different issues and that a defendant is not entitled to a jury on the issue
of competence to be sentenced).
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B. Current case law110
1.

State v. Rotherham111

In Rotherham, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the procedure to be followed after a finding of incompetence.112
Ultimately, the Court found New Mexico’s procedure to be constitutional.113 Though
this procedure is outside of the scope of this article, Rotherham bears mention here
because the New Mexico Supreme Court recently identified Rotherham as
articulating the correct formulation of the conditions necessary for a defendant to be
found competent.114 The Rotherham formulation cites to Dusky v. United States,115
and includes three elements. First, to be competent, the defendant must have
“sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding.”116 Second, the defendant must have “a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”117 And third, “the accused
must have the capacity to assist in his own defense and to comprehend the reasons
for punishment.”118
2.

State v. Garcia119

Garcia is valuable because it clarifies the role of the expert who evaluates
a defendant upon the court’s order. Arthur Garcia faced charges in connection with
a car accident.120 The district court ordered an evaluation after his defense counsel
raised the issue of competence to stand trial.121 The evaluation found Garcia to be
incompetent.122 The state objected, requesting another evaluation because the state
contended that the evaluator was “the defense’s expert.”123 However, the district
court denied the request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, determining that when the

110. These cases were decided under N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-1 to -2 (1993), which has not changed
substantially since 1978 when the current compilation was completed. The last change occurred in 1993
when minor adjustments were made (specifically, adding the phrase “to proceed in a criminal case” to the
first sentence, and replacing the word “if” with the phrase “unless the case is dismissed upon motion of a
party when” in the second sentence). Cf. Act of Apr. 6, 1993, ch. 240, 1993 N.M. Laws 2356.
111. State v. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, 923 P.2d 1131.
112. Id. ¶ 1 (“At issue on appeal is the constitutionality of New Mexico’s Mental Illness and
Competency Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 31-9-1 to -1.5 (Cum.Supp.1995) . . . which provides the procedure
to be followed in cases where a criminal defendant is incompetent to stand trial.”).
113. Id. ¶ 62.
114. State v. Linares, 2017-NMSC-014, ¶ 34, n.8, 393 P.3d 691 (stating that New Mexico courts
should adhere to the formulation in Rotherham) (citing Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048).
115. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
116. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, ¶ 13 (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. 402).
117. Id. (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. 402).
118. Id.
119. State v. Garcia, 2000-NMCA-014, 998 P.2d 186.
120. Id. ¶ 2.
121. Id. ¶ 7.
122. Id. ¶ 8.
123. Id.
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court orders an evaluation, the evaluator is the court’s expert, not either party’s
expert.124
3.

State v. Flores125

When the Flores opinion was published in 2005, it replaced State v. Folk126
as the touchstone case in the competency jurisprudence.127 In addition to being an
important case in the development of the doctrine, it is illustrative of the pretrial
delays that occur when competence is raised.
Ruben Flores was charged with murder in January 1999.128 The proceedings
were stayed in May 1999 so that Flores’ competence could be determined.129 After
the state stipulated that Flores was not competent, the court ordered treatment.130
Seven months later, in December 1999, Flores was transferred to Las Vegas Medical
Center.131 After three months, Flores’ treating doctors determined that Flores was
now competent, and he was transferred back to jail in March 2000.132 While awaiting
a second competency hearing, Flores was involved in an incident at the jail that
resulted in a charge for aggravated battery upon a peace officer in December 2000,
nine months after he had been treated to competency and returned to the jail.133 This
charge was joined with the murder case for the purpose of determining his
competence to stand trial.134
The hearing to determine Flores’ competence took place in district court in
May, June, and October 2001, more than a year after Flores had returned to jail after
he had been treated to competence.135 Conflicting testimony was offered as to Flores’
competence to stand trial, and the judge ultimately found Flores competent to stand
trial and not “mentally retarded.”136
Flores’ trial for aggravated battery began in August 2002 before a different
judge.137 On the eve of trial, Flores’ attorney raised the question of Flores’ present
competence to stand trial.138 Even though the competency determination had been
made ten months before, the judge deferred to the prior finding of competence and

124. Id. ¶ 32 (“The record indicates that Dr. Cave was selected by the New Mexico Department of
Health, not Defendant, and that she was further selected as the court’s expert, not Defendant’s.”)
(alterations in original).
125. State v. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135, 124 P.3d 1175.
126. State v. Folk, 1952-NMSC-079, 247 P.2d 165.
127. According to Westlaw’s citing references tab, Folk was cited by at least nineteen New Mexico
cases between 1954 and 2005. Flores is the most recent case to reference Folk as precedent.
128. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135, ¶ 2.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. ¶ 3.
132. Id.
133. Id. ¶ 4.
134. Id.
135. Id. ¶ 5. Flores was in jail after being treated to competency for 14 months before his competency
hearing began. See Id. ¶ 3.
136. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
137. Id. ¶ 6 (noting the murder charge was resolved by Flores entering a guilty plea).
138. Id. ¶ 7.
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did not consider the issue again.139 Flores was convicted and subsequently
appealed.140 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding no
abuse of discretion when the trial court declined to consider anew Flores’
competence.141
Flores is important in the doctrinal development for several reasons. First,
there is an explicit requirement that a request for a competency determination be
made based on more than just the impression of counsel.142 Second, although Flores
not specifically require a full evidentiary hearing to create a reasonable doubt
adequate to require an evaluation, it does appear to require some evidence. In
affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals stated, “[t]he observations and
conclusions of Defendant’s counsel as to Defendant’s ability to consult and
understand were not supported by any affidavits or testimony regarding observations
of Defendant’s present abilities.”143 The court provided as an example of evidence
that could have been adequate to create a reasonable doubt: “an affidavit from
someone who has observed the defendant and formulated an opinion about his or her
competency, such as a corrections officer or defense counsel’s paralegal.”144
Finally, Flores offers a clue as to why New Mexico courts have come to
require more than a question as to competency145 provided by the statutory scheme:
Of course, trial courts at times may be legitimately leery of
requests for competency evaluations, since some requests are
undoubtedly made primarily or solely for the purpose of delay. We
note such concern as expressed in Drope: “The sentencing judge
observed that motions for psychiatric examinations have often
been made merely for the purpose of delay, and estimated that
almost seventy-five percent of those sent for psychiatric
examinations are returned mentally competent.” 420 U.S. at 178
n.13, 95 S.Ct. 896 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
It is likely this concern that gave rise to New Mexico case law’s
requirement that a defendant offer something more than defense
counsel’s bare representations about the defendant’s
competency.146
Since Flores was decided and published in 2005, most of the cases
addressing competency to stand trial have been unpublished,147 and the doctrine
regarding competency has remained relatively stable. The cases that have been
published deal primarily with situations where the established procedure was not
139. Id. ¶ 11.
140. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
141. Id. ¶ 35.
142. Id. ¶¶ 27–30 (stating that “in New Mexico law, something more than counsel’s unsubstantiated
assertions and opinion regarding a defendant’s competency is required to pass the reasonable doubt and
good cause tests”).
143. Id. ¶ 35.
144. Id. ¶ 31.
145. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1 (1993) (“Whenever it appears that there is a question as to the
defendant’s competency to proceed in a criminal case . . . .”).
146. Id. ¶ 30.
147. See Rule 12-405 NMRA (indicating that in New Mexico, unpublished cases are not precedential).
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followed.148 Montoya,149 published in 2010, involves a clear abuse of discretion by a
trial court when it refused to allow the issue of competence to be raised.150
Gutierrez,151 published in 2015, addressed an unconstitutional finding of competency
after incompetence had already been established.152 Thus, Flores has remained the
touchstone case in the competency jurisprudence for over a decade.
4.

State v. Linares153

Linares, the New Mexico Supreme Court’s most recent published decision,
is notable for several reasons. First, Linares is a very recent example of the extended
pretrial incarceration that occurs when competency is raised, demonstrating that
defendants who raise competency in New Mexico still endure long periods of
detention without the benefit of trial.154 Second, Linares describes the distinct
procedure that is to be used when a defendant is found to be incompetent due to
intellectual disability compared to other conditions.155 The Court notes that “mental
retardation, in and of itself, is not conclusive evidence that a defendant is
incompetent.”156 This case also shows that a finding of intellectual disability and
incompetence does not mean a defendant will be released, but may be subject to civil
commitment upon a finding of dangerousness.157 Lastly, the Court in Linares
unequivocally criticizes New Mexico’s continued use of the outdated phrase
“mentally retarded,” and recommends that the New Mexico Legislature revise
statutes “applicable to the developmentally disabled and replace any terms that have
pejorative or derogatory connotations with suitable and respectful alternatives.”158
5.

State v. Stock159

The final case that bears mentioning is Stock, not because of its contribution
to the doctrine, but because it exemplifies several of the reasons New Mexico must
improve the procedure for competency determinations.
Paul Stock was charged with numerous counts of criminal sexual
penetration of a minor.160 When the issue of competence to stand trial was raised, the

148. See, e.g., State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 62, 366 P.3d 1121 (involving a defendant who
raised competency, but the issue was not addressed directly because it was raised to delay the case).
149. State v. Montoya, 2010-NMCA-067, 238 P.3d 369.
150. Id. ¶ 2.
151. State v. Gutierrez, 2015-NMCA-082, 355 P.3d 93.
152. Id. ¶¶ 31, 42 (describing that the hearing was to make a determination about “mental retardation”
only, but the judge made a determination of competency without notice or adequate evidence).
153. State v. Linares, 2017-NMSC-014, 393 P.3d 691.
154. Id. ¶¶ 4–19 (describing the events over the three years between indictment and eventual finding
of incompetence to stand trial).
155. Id. ¶¶ 25, 33–34, 42.
156. Id. ¶ 33.
157. See id. ¶ 42 (describing the procedure for civil commitment after a finding of incompetency due
to “mental retardation”).
158. Id. ¶ 1, n.1.
159. State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, 147 P.3d 676.
160. Id. ¶ 2.
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proceeding was stayed.161 Ultimately, through a series of errors and oversights, Stock
spent over five years in jail without a trial.162 The charges were dismissed by the trial
court due to unreasonable delay.163 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision,164
and the Supreme Court quashed certiorari.165
Stock demonstrates how extreme the delay can be when competency is
raised166 and the dilemma faced by defendants and lawyers when a defendant’s
competency is questionable. Stock was described as having “the intellectual
functioning of a twelve-year-old.”167 The Court of Appeals noted that even if Stock
had wanted to object to the delay, he was often not transported to hearings.168 Due to
the delay, the charges against Stock were never ultimately decided. Though it is not
determinative of Stock’s guilt on the past charges, after his release, he again faced
charges for similar crimes.169 He ultimately pled no contest170 and is currently
incarcerated.171 If his initial case had been handled effectively, the interests of justice
may have been served and Stock may have been deterred from committing the later
crimes, or he may have had the opportunity for rehabilitation if he had been convicted
as a sexual offender. Stock serves as a cautionary tale and demonstrates some of the
reasons New Mexico must improve its procedure for making competency
determinations.
PART IV: PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE RULE FOR DETERMINING
COMPETENCY
New Mexico’s current procedure for making competency determinations is
in desperate need of revision as evidenced by the disproportionately long length of
pretrial detention that defendants who raise competency face and the potential for
this delay to thwart the goals of the criminal justice system. This section will briefly
note problems with the current procedure and then provide a critique of the proposed
revisions to the rule for making competency decisions.
A.

New Mexico’s current procedure for making competency determinations

The current procedure lacks clarity and has created confusion and
inconsistency in New Mexico’s criminal justice system. Problems stem from

161. Id.
162. Id. ¶ 11 (noting that numerous delays resulted in five years passing since the alleged incident).
163. Id. ¶ 10.
164. Id. ¶ 1.
165. State v. Stock, 2007-NMCERT-001, 152 P.3d 152.
166. See Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 11 (noting there were five years between arraignment and
dismissal).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See N.M. COURTS CASE LOOKUP, https://caselookup.nmcourts.gov/caselookup/ (search using
“case number search” and entering number “D-202-CR-200902879”) (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
170. Id.
171. N.M. CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, http://search.cd.nm.gov/history_detail (search using the last
name “Stock,” first name “Paul,” offender number “480072,” and NMCD number “71862”) (last visited
Oct. 15, 2017) (showing that Stock is currently an inmate at the Lea County Correctional Facility).
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inconsistencies between the rule and the statute, and from internal inconsistencies in
the current rule.
First, there are multiple, inconsistent statements of the burden of proof
required to trigger a determination of competence to stand trial. The statute requires
an evaluation simply when a motion is made.172 The rule adds a requirement to show
“good cause” when the issue is raised by filing a motion173 and a requirement to
establish “reasonable doubt” if the issue is raised before trial.174
Second, it is unclear what, if any, evidence is required to trigger an
evaluation. The statute does not mention any level of evidence necessary to order an
evaluation.175 The rule states that there must be “evidence” upon which to base a
reasonable doubt,176 but there is no clarification about the requirement. The Court of
Appeals, interpreting the rule in State v. Flores,177 indicated that there must be
evidence such as affidavits or testimony regarding a defendant’s possible
incompetence before a trial court is required to make an evaluation of competence to
stand trial.178
Third, there is a discrepancy regarding when the proceedings are stayed.
The statute requires suspension of the proceedings whenever there is a question of
competence until competency has been determined.179 In contrast, the rule requires
a stay only after a defendant has been found incompetent.180 Following the rule
would allow criminal proceedings to continue while competency is determined, in
clear violation of due process.
Finally, a practical issue that contributes greatly to delay when competency
is raised is the paucity of evaluators. Particularly in rural areas, defendants who
require a competency evaluation endure long periods of pretrial incarceration not
only because of the confusing procedure, but because there simply are not enough
evaluators in New Mexico. This issue needs to be addressed because even if the
procedure is flawless, without evaluators to perform assessments, there will continue
to be disproportionately long pretrial incarceration for defendants who raise
competency.
B.

Critique of the Proposed Revisions

Perhaps due in part to concern about disproportionately lengthy pretrial
detention of defendants who raise competency, the New Mexico Supreme Court
recognized the need to revise to the procedure for competency evaluations. The Ad
Hoc Committee on Rules for Mental Health Proceedings was tasked with revising
the existing rules after the Committee for Criminal Procedure was unable to
compromise on a proposal. Proposed revisions to the rules were published and

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-2 (1967).
Rule 5-602(C) NMRA.
Rule 5-602(B)(2) NMRA.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1 (1993).
Rule 5-602(B)(2) NMRA
State v. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135, 124 P.3d 1175.
Id. ¶¶ 30–31.
N.M. STAT. ANN § 31-9-1.
Rule 5-602(B)(3)(a) NMRA.
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opened for public comment in March 2016.181 The volume and depth of the
comments received is indicative of not only the importance of this issue in our legal
community, but also the complexity of creating a rule that addresses the intricate
details and competing interests when competence to stand trial is raised.
This critique is focused on simplifying the initial process in order to reduce
pretrial detention for defendants who raise competency. This is only one of the many
competing interests that the Committee must consider when drafting these rules. At
times, the critique is intended to explain a particular aspect of the rule that
commentators found objectionable, and at others will offer alternatives that the
committee and/or future commentators might consider based on this author’s
extensive research of the American Bar Association recommendations, case law,
procedures used by other states, and review of all the public comments submitted to
the committee.
The critique offered here is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of
the entire proposed revisions. For example, it will not address proposed rules 6507.1,182 8-507,183 8-507.1,184 or the proposed forms. It will not identify
typographical or obvious errors that have been pointed out in public comments.
Furthermore, this critique will not address areas that others have expertise in and are
better suited to make suggestions, particularly realistic time limits for accomplishing
the requirements of the rule, which should come from attorneys, judges, and the
evaluators who perform this work. This author highly encourages those with
knowledge and interest to read the next version of the proposed rules and provide
comments, which according to Rule 23-106.1(B), should be published in March of
either 2018 or 2019.
1.

How the proposed rule addresses the problems with the current
procedure
a.

The proposed rule needs to clarify that the burden of proof for
triggering a determination of competency is a good faith basis.

As noted in Part IV (A), there are currently inconsistent statements of the
burden of proof required to trigger a determination of competence in the rule, and no
burden of proof articulated in the statute.185 The proposed rule seems to address this
problem by lowering the burden of proof and requiring that any time there is a
question about competency, a motion based on a good faith will trigger an evaluation.
The proposed rule states: “When a question of competence is raised by a party, a
motion for a competency evaluation shall be in writing and shall contain the
following: (a) a statement that the motion is based on a good faith belief that the

181. Proposed Revisions to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts, Magistrate
Courts, and Municipal Courts and the Criminal Forms, N.M.CTS. [hereinafter Proposed Rule],
https://supremecourt.nmcourts.gov/uploads/FileLinks/68d7e94c91244c3582e80b8272c30db1/2016_01.
pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).
182. Id. (Competency; transfer to district court).
183. Id. (Insanity [or incompetency]; transfer to district court).
184. Id. (Competency; transfer to district court).
185. See supra Part IV(A).
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defendant may not be not competent to stand trial.”186 This change aligns not only
with the spirit of New Mexico’s statute,187 but also with the United States Supreme
Court’s recommendation that an evaluation be ordered when there is any question
about competency.188
However, when the proposed rule discusses resolving the motion in section
F, it requires that the court find that the motion is “supported by probable cause to
believe that the defendant is not competent to stand trial.”189 The requirement of
“probable cause” raises the burden of proof above “a good faith” basis. The proposed
rule may be recreating the problem in the current rule of inconsistent statements of
the burden of proof. Just as the current rule is confusing because there is not a clear
and consistent burden of proof to trigger an evaluation, it is likely the proposed rule
will also be confusing. The burden of proof must be clarified; the burden of proof
required to trigger an evaluation of competency should be a good faith basis not only
because it aligns with the statute, but it is also in accord with the ABA
recommendations.190
b.

The proposed rule should clearly state that no evidence is required to
trigger an evaluation.

Proposed rule 5-602.1 (D)(1) requires a written motion that contains the
following:
(a) a statement that the motion is based on a good faith belief that
the defendant may not be not [sic] competent to stand trial;
(b) a recital of the specific facts, observations, and conversations
with the defendant that have formed the basis for the motion. If
filed by defense counsel, the motion shall contain such information
without invading the attorney-client privilege;
(c) a statement that the motion is not filed for purposes of delay;
(d) a statement of whether the motion is opposed as provided in
Rule 5-120 NMRA; and
(e) a request for a competency evaluation.191
Although a motion seems to be enough to trigger the trial court to order an
evaluation, the probable cause requirement found at Section F192 makes it unclear
whether or not probable cause can be found from the motion alone or if additional
186. Proposed Rule 5-602.1(D)(1), supra note 181.
187. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-2 (1967) (requiring an evaluation when a motion is made with no
required burden of proof).
188. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 (1975) (stating it would have been “the better
practice to order an immediate examination” when there was a question as to defendant’s competence).
189. Proposed Rule 5-602.1(F)(1), supra note 181.
190. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.4(a), at 188 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989). Other
states’ statutes also require only a question of competence to trigger a determination. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-8.5-103(1) (2012) (“Whenever the question of a defendant’s competency to proceed is
raised. . . .”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:17(I)(a) (2016) (“When . . . said court is notified . . . that there
is a question as to the competency. . . .”).
191. Proposed Rule 5-602.1(D)(1)(a)–(e), supra note 181.
192. Id. 5-602.1(F)(1) (requiring the trial court to file an order “finding whether the motion is
supported by probable cause to believe that the defendant is not competent to stand trial”).
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evidence is required. Furthermore, if the rule does not specify that evidence is not
required, trial courts will likely look to the case law, particularly State v. Flores,193
and conclude that evidence is required.194
The proposed rule should specifically state that evidence is not required to
find probable cause and that the probable cause requirement will be met by the
requirements in the motion. Requiring evidence before an evaluation is not
reasonable, as aptly noted by one court when it stated, “[i]t cannot reasonably be
supposed that Congress intended to require the accused to produce, in order to get a
mental examination, enough evidence to prove that he is incompetent . . . If the
accused already had such evidence, there would be little need for the
examination.”195
c.

The proposed rule needs further clarification about what
proceedings are stayed when competency is raised.

The proposed rule attempts to clarify what proceedings are stayed by
providing a compromise that will likely decrease the amount of pretrial incarceration
defendants who raise competency have to endure, though it does need some
adjustment to be practical.
Section E reads:
Effect of filing of motion; proceedings not stayed. The filing of
a motion for a competency evaluation shall not stay the
proceedings or toll any time limits in the case, provided that the
court shall not take any action affecting the defendant’s substantial
rights while the motion is pending or the question of the
defendant’s competency remains unresolved. For the purposes of
this paragraph, an action affecting the defendant’s substantial
rights includes, for example, consideration of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, holding an evidentiary hearing, or proceeding to
trial, and does not include addressing discovery disputes or setting
or reviewing the conditions of release.196
It is misleading for the heading to read “proceedings not stayed”197 because
it implies that all proceedings continue while competency is being decided, which is
not what the rest of the section explains.198 For clarity, the heading should read
“Proceedings affecting defendant’s substantive rights stayed.”

193. State v. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135, 124 P.3d 1175. Flores remains the touchstone case in New
Mexico regarding competency to stand trial. See supra Part III(B)(3).
194. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135, ¶ 17 (“Thus, whether a ‘question as to the defendant’s competency to
proceed’ exists is judged by whether there is evidence that raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s
competency to stand trial.”); supra Part III(B)(3).
195. Mitchell v. United States, 316 F.2d 354, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1963); see also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-4.2(a) cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989) (noting that the ABA
strongly discourages evidentiary hearings, stating “[the court] need not be convinced that a defendant is
incompetent to stand trial before ordering an evaluation, because that is the objective of an evaluation.”).
196. Proposed Rule 5-602.1(E), supra note 181.
197. Id.
198. See id. (explaining that proceedings that affect a defendant’s substantive rights will be stayed).
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The rule should clearly distinguish between proceedings that affect
substantive rights and proceedings that are purely legal or procedural. Proceedings
that affect substantive rights are actions that require the defendant’s participation in
order to resolve questions of fact; legal or procedural actions do not require the
presence of the defendant.199 Staying only the proceedings that affect a defendant’s
substantive rights will assure that the process will continue while the evaluation is
conducted and the determination is being made, thereby reducing the overall amount
of time a defendant who raises competency will remain detained before trial. Finally,
the phrase “for example” should be changed to “including but not limited to” to
clarify that courts have discretion to proceed with actions that may not be
contemplated by the proposed rule.
Overall, the proposed rule provides clarifications that will eliminate the
problems with the current procedure, though some adjustments are still needed to
further simplify and clearly articulate the procedure. In addition to the changes that
address current problems, there are other changes that would improve the rule;
additional analysis is offered in the next section.
2.

Additional suggestions to improve the proposed rule
a.

The rule should not list possible improper purposes of raising
competency.

Section 5-602.1(A) reads:
Purpose; scope. This rule is intended to provide a timely,
efficient, and accurate procedure for resolving whether a defendant
is competent to stand trial. Competency to stand trial is distinct
from other questions about mental health, such as the defendant’s
sanity at the time of the alleged offense and capacity to form
specific intent. A party shall not use this rule for purposes
unrelated to the defendant’s competency to stand trial, such as to
obtain information for mitigation of sentence, to obtain a favorable
plea negotiation, or to delay the proceedings against the
defendant.200
The last sentence of this section should be replaced with, “A party shall not
use this rule for purposes unrelated to the defendant’s competency to stand trial.
Other uses of this rule will be considered improper and are subject to sanctions.”

199. See FLA. R. CRIM. P.3.210(a)(2) (1992) (“The incompetence of the defendant shall not preclude
such judicial action, hearings on motions of the parties, discovery proceedings, or other procedures that
do not require the personal participation of the defendant.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8.5-102(1)
(2008) (“[A] determination that a defendant is incompetent to proceed shall not preclude the furtherance
of the proceedings by the court to consider and decide matters, including a preliminary hearing and
motions, that are susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without the personal participation of
the defendant.”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-106(g) (West 2013) (“If the defendant is found
incompetent to stand trial, defense counsel may make any legal objection to the prosecution that may be
determined fairly before trial and without the personal participation of the defendant.”).
200. Proposed Rule 5-602.1(A), supra note 181.
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Although there is a concern that competency is raised for improper purposes,201 there
are many alternative explanations that must be considered, particularly in New
Mexico where raising competency often results in disproportionately extended
pretrial incarceration. The following non-exhaustive list it is offered to demonstrate
that there are many plausible explanations other than manipulation or improper
raising of the issue of competency that explain why so many more defendants are
evaluated than are found not competent to stand trial.
For instance, since lawyers and courts are required to err on the side of
caution when there is a question of competency,202 competency should be raised
when symptoms of mental illness, intellectual disability, brain injury, physical
illness, or effects of drug use appear to inhibit a defendant’s ability to understand and
participate in the judicial process.203 However, these impairments may not amount
to incompetence and only an examination performed by an expert can make the
distinction between these conditions and incompetence. Furthermore, because
evaluations do not occur immediately, a defendant might present quite differently
when the evaluation finally occurs, if, for example, the effects of substance use have
worn off or if medication has been given to treat mental illness. Additionally, as with
intellectual disability, there is a stigma attached to being labeled incompetent;
defendants may “fake good” to avoid being labeled.204 Also, felony defendants who
are deemed not competent and dangerous can be detained in a locked facility for
treatment, without the benefit of a trial.205 Ultimately, a defendant could be subjected
to commitment and detained for long periods, again, without a determination of guilt
or innocence.206 Thus, defendants have good reasons to avoid a finding of
incompetence if they can, which may affect the number of evaluations that result in
findings of incompetence.

201. See supra Part III(B)(3). As noted by the Court of Appeals in State v. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135,
¶ 30, 124 P.3d 1175, since approximately 75 percent of competency evaluations find defendants
competent, “trial courts at times may be legitimately leery of requests for competency evaluations.”
Nationally, this rate has remained consistent. See SLATE ET AL., supra note 11 (reporting that between 20
and 30 percent of defendants referred for evaluations are found to be incompetent to stand trial); see also
FREEMAN, CHAPEL & MALAN, supra note 18 (citing several studies that support these rates).
202. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 385–386 (1966) (determining that when the evidence
presents a “bona fide doubt” as to the defendant’s competency, a court’s failure to order a competency
evaluation and hearing violates the defendant’s right to due process).
203. As noted in the Background section, supra, none of these conditions are conclusive of lack of
competence to stand trial.
204. See generally, ROBERT B. EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE, REVISED AND UPDATED
EDITION (Berkley: Univ. of Cal. Press, rev. ed. 1993); James R. Patton & Denis W. Keyes, Death Penalty
Issues Following Atkins, 14(4) EXCEPTIONALITY 237, 252 (2006) (“[M]any individuals with mental
retardation, when given the chance, want to “pass” as normal and shed the label of mental retardation.”).
205. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1.2(B) (1993); see, e.g., State v. Demongey, 2008-NMCA-066, 187
P.3d 679 (demonstrating substantial time period where there were five years between arraignment and
evidentiary hearing that ultimately resulted in defendant’s commitment to Las Vegas Medical Center for
a time equal to the maximum prison sentence he would have received if convicted); State v. Rotherham,
1996-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 2–12, 923 P.2d 1131, (describing several examples of defendants who received
commitments without trial, including Christopher Rotherham who indicted in June 1989 and remained at
the State hospital until he was criminally committed in April 1994).
206. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1.5(D) (1993); see, e.g., State v. Linares, 2017-NMSC-014, ¶ 42,
393 P.3d 691.
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The definition of competency should be changed to conform to the
definition recently articulated by the New Mexico Supreme Court.207

The definition of competency in the proposed rule should conform to the
definition recently affirmed by the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v.
Linares.208 As noted by the Court in Linares, there has been confusion about the
exact definition of competency, and the Court stated that the correct definition is the
one articulated in Rotherham.209 The definition of competency should read:
“Whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his or her lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him or her, and the capacity to assist in his
or her own defense and to comprehend the reasons for punishment.”210
c.

The rule should clarify the requirements of the motion requesting an
evaluation.

The requirements for a motion are:
When a question of competence is raised by a party, a motion for
a competency evaluation shall be in writing and shall contain the
following:
(a) a statement that the motion is based on a good faith belief that
the defendant may not be not competent to stand trial;
(b) a recital of the specific facts, observations, and conversations
with the defendant that have formed the basis for the motion. If
filed by defense counsel, the motion shall contain such information
without invading the attorney–client privilege;
(c) a statement that the motion is not filed for purposes of delay;
(d) a statement of whether the motion is opposed as provided in
Rule 5-120 NMRA; and
(e) a request for a competency evaluation.211
To start, the requirements listed in (b) should be reworded to state, “a recital
of the basic underlying facts, observations, or conversations that form the basis for
the motion.” Even though the current requirements are similar to the ABA
recommendation and other states’ requirements,212 this level of specificity goes
beyond providing a good faith basis for the motion, risks the party having to reveal
207. Proposed Rule 5-602.1(B)(1), supra note 181 (defining competency as “whether the defendant
understands the nature and significance of the criminal proceedings against him, has a factual
understanding of the criminal charges, and is able to assist his attorney in his defense”).
208. Linares, 2017-NMSC-014.
209. Id. ¶ 34, n.8.
210. See id. ¶ 34 (quoting Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, ¶ 13).
211. Proposed Rule 602.1(D), supra note 181.
212. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1002 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1175.2(A)
(West 2014) (“The application for determination of competency shall allege that the person is incompetent
to undergo further proceedings, and shall state facts sufficient to raise a doubt as to the competency of the
person.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-3 (West 2008) (“The petition shall contain a recital of the facts,
observations, and conversations with the defendant that have formed the basis for the petition.”);
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, 7-4.2 (d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989) (“The motion should
also set forth the specific facts that have formed the basis for the motion.”).
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privileged information,213 and potentially creates unnecessary tension in the
attorney-client relationship.214 Next, the second sentence of (b)215 may be confusing
and should be more explicit by stating, “If filed by defense counsel, the motion shall
not contain information that would violate attorney-client privilege.”
Finally, though the requirement at D(1)(a) that the motion contain a
statement that it “is based on a good faith belief that the defendant may not be
competent to stand trial”216 may be objectionable to some who might find it
unnecessary or even insulting, it should not be changed. This requirement is
supported by the ABA217 and other states’ procedures that have a similar
requirement.218 It does not presuppose bad faith, but rather is necessary to validate
the motion and to minimize the criticism that a higher burden of proof should be
required.219
d.

The rule should clarify that a hearing will only be required before an
evaluation is ordered if there is probable cause to believe that the
motion was brought for an improper purpose.

The proposed rule provides instruction for resolving a motion for an
evaluation of competency in Section F:
Resolution of motion; probable cause. A motion for a
competency evaluation shall not be opposed, except on the
grounds that the motion is advanced for an improper purpose such
as harassment or delay. In considering a motion, the court shall
comply with the following procedures.

213. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. PRO. § 3.210(b)(1) (2010) (stating that when defense files the motion,
“[t]o the extent that it does not invade the lawyer-client privilege, the motion shall contain a recital of the
specific observations of and conversations with the defendant that have formed the basis for the motion.”);
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989) (“[T]he defense
counsel should not divulge confidential communications or communications protected by the attorneyclient privilege.”).
214. See, e.g., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, 7-4.2, cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N
1989) (discussing the ethical conflicts that raising competency may create for an attorney).
215. Proposed Rule 5-602.1 (D)(1)(b), supra note 181 (“If filed by defense counsel, the motion shall
contain such information without invading the attorney-client privilege.”).
216. Proposed Rule 5-602.1 (D)(1)(a), supra note 181.
217. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, 7-4.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989) (“A
motion for evaluation should . . . contain a certificate of counsel indicating that the motion is based on a
good faith doubt that the defendant is not competent to stand trial and that it is not filed for the purpose of
delay.”).
218. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8.5-102 (b) (West 2008) (“A motion to determine competency shall
be in writing and contain a certificate of counsel stating that the motion is based on a good faith doubt
that the defendant is competent to proceed.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-3 (2)(a) (West 2008) (“The
petition shall contain a certificate that it is filed in good faith and on reasonable grounds to believe the
defendant is incompetent to proceed.”); FLA. R. CRIM. PRO. § 3.210(b)(1) (2010) (“A certificate of counsel
that the motion is made in good faith and on reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is
incompetent to proceed.”).
219. As noted in Part II (4)(C), supra, courts may be leery that competency is improperly raised, and
sometimes for good reason. See, e.g., State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 62, 366 P.3d 1121 (noting that
competency was raised to delay the case).
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(1) Unopposed. Within forty-eight (48) hours of the filing of a
motion that is unopposed under Subparagraph (D)(1)(d) of this
rule, the court shall file an order substantially in the form approved
by the Supreme Court finding whether the motion is supported by
probable cause to believe that the defendant is not competent to
stand trial. The determination shall be based solely upon the
allegations in the motion and upon the court’s own observations of
the defendant.
(2) Opposed. A response in opposition to a motion for a
competency evaluation shall be in writing, shall cite specific facts
in opposition to the motion, and shall be filed within five (5) days
of the filing of the motion or be deemed waived. Upon the filing
of a response in opposition, the court shall do one of the following:
(a) unless the court determines that a hearing on the motion is
necessary, file an order substantially in the form approved by the
Supreme Court within forty-eight (48) hours finding whether there
is probable cause to believe that the defendant is not competent to
stand trial; or
(b) within five (5) days of the filing of a response under this
Subparagraph, hold a hearing on the motion and file an order
substantially in the form approved by the Supreme Court finding
whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is not
competent to stand trial.220
The proposed rule improves upon the current procedure by clearly
indicating that a hearing before an evaluation of competency is not required.
However, to be internally consistent and to align with the statute,221 the rule should
clarify that only reason a court can require a hearing is to determine whether the
motion was brought for an improper purpose, and not “whether there is probable
cause to believe that the defendant is not competent to stand trial.”222 Since a motion
for evaluation can only be opposed because it is allegedly brought for an improper
purpose,223 the alleged improper purpose must be the focus of the hearing. The party
opposing the motion must bear the burden to demonstrate an improper purpose, and
probable cause to believe the defendant is not competent may be used only to rebut
the allegation. Consequently, Section F (2)(b) should clarify that the focus of the
hearing is not the motion, but the alleged improper purpose, and unless an improper
purpose is proven, the court shall file an order substantially in the form approved by
the Supreme Court finding there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is
not competent to stand trial.
e.

The rule should not include a statement about sanctions if a party
lacked reasonable grounds.

Section F (3) states “Sanctions. If the court finds that either party lacked
reasonable grounds to file or oppose the motion, the court may initiate contempt
220. Proposed Rule 5-602.1(F), supra note 181.
221. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-2 (1967) (requiring an examination simply when a motion is filed and
stating that such examination is required before a court can make a determination of competency).
222. Proposed Rule 5-602.1(F)(2)(b), supra note 181.
223. Id. 5-602.1(F).
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proceedings consistent with Rule 5-112 NMRA.” This statement should be
eliminated. Foremost, an attorney is obligated to raise the issue if there is any
question of a defendant’s competency, but since around seventy-five percent of the
time evaluations find competency,224 clearly the circumstances that raise the question
initially do not always persist. This requirement could have a chilling effect on
attorneys’ raising competency for fear of being found unreasonable if their
suspicions are not confirmed by the evaluation, which could foreseeably lead to
violations of defendants’ due process rights. Also attorneys are already subject to
discipline and sanctions if they file motions without merit,225 making it unnecessary
for the rule to reiterate an attorney’s professional obligations.
f.

The proposed rule should state that the report will not be provided to
the prosecution when the evaluation finds the defendant is competent
and the issue is not contested or is withdrawn.

Section H of the proposed rule226 should include a provision that if the
evaluation finds the defendant competent and the finding is not contested, or the
party who raised the issue withdraws it, the evaluator’s report shall not be provided
to the prosecution. If the issue of competency is not in contention, and since the
information can only be used to determine competency,227 it is not relevant to any
proceedings.
Additionally, Equal Protection demands that people with disabilities are
treated equally under the law.228 The people for whom competency to stand trial
might be questioned are most likely people with disabilities.229 If a defendant’s
competency is never questioned, the private health information used to make a
competency determination would not ordinarily be revealed during a criminal
proceeding. However, defendants whose disabilities make their competency
questionable are subject to evaluation and therefore normally confidential
information may be exposed. If not for a disability, a person’s competence would not
be questioned, and his or her private health information would remain confidential.
Since a defendant without a disability would not be compelled to share potentially
prejudicial and private health information with the prosecution, to assure equal
protection, a defendant with disabilities who has been found competent should not
have to reveal this information, unless the issue is contested and the court requires a
hearing on the issue.
g.

The rule should allow trial courts to have discretion when time limits
have not been met instead of having a bright line rule to dismiss

224. See, e.g., SLATE ET AL., supra note 11, at 317 (reporting that between 20 and 30 percent of
defendants referred for evaluations are found to be incompetent to stand trial).
225. See Rules 16-100 to -805 NMRA.
226. Proposed Rule 5-602.1(H), supra note 181.
227. See id. 5-602(E); id. 5-602.1(N).
228. See U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (the “Equal Protection Clause”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18
(Due Process; Equal Protection; Sex Discrimination).
229. Disabilities that may manifest in a way that makes a defendant’s competency questionable
include mental illness, intellectual limitations, traumatic brain injuries, and other health impairments that
affect cognitive function.
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cases when time limits are exceeded.
Section L of the proposed rule reads:
Effect of noncompliance with time limits. (1) The court may
deny an untimely motion for extension of time or may grant it and
impose other sanctions or remedial measures, as the court may
deem appropriate in the circumstances. (2) In the event the
question of the defendant’s competence is not resolved within the
time limits provided in this rule, including any court-ordered
extensions, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice.230
Based on the comments that were submitted, the requirement that cases be
dismissed without prejudice if the time limits are not met seems to be the most
objectionable part of the proposed rule.231 There are many reasons why a decision
about competency might not be made according to the timelines, primarily the lack
of evaluators to create the reports, but also defendants not complying with the
evaluation, lawyers not attending to deadlines, defendants who are genuinely not
competent and unable to participate in the evaluation to name but a few. There are
also valid reasons that cases should not be summarily dismissed, including public
safety, judicial efficiency, and the overall credibility and reliability of our criminal
justice system. Given the various reasons the deadlines might not be met and the
important interests at stake, there should not be a bright-line rule for dismissing
cases. The rule should allow the trial court to have discretion to provide a remedy
depending upon the individual circumstance of the case and the reasons for delay,
with some ultimate cutoff to prevent extreme situations of extended pretrial
incarceration.232
h.

Issues the proposed rule does not address

The proposed rule does not address how long a competency finding lasts or
when a new determination should be made. As evidenced in New Mexico’s case law,
courts often struggle with this issue when there is a gap between the completion of
an evaluation or a restoration to competency and a trial.233 Ideally, the changes in the
proposed rule, including stricter timelines, will decrease the gap between a finding
230. Proposed Rule 5-602.1(L), supra note 181.
231. See id. at 23, 25, 41, 46, 56.
232. See, e.g., State v. Linares, 2017-NMSC-014, 393 P.3d 691 (accounting a pretrial incarceration of
over three years between indictment and eventual finding of incompetence to stand trial); State v. Serros,
2016-NMSC-008, 366 P.3d 1121 (recounting a situation of four years and three months of pretrial
incarceration in protective custody with delay in part due to competency being raised); State v. Stock,
2006-NMCA-140, 147 P.3d 885 (indicating a pretrial incarceration for three years with delay in part due
to competency being raised); State v. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135, 124 P.3d 1175 (describing over three
years of incarceration that included treatment to competency at the state hospital).
233. See, e.g., State v. Castillo, No. 31054, 2013 WL 5310262, ¶ 7 (N.M. Ct. App. August 28, 2013)
(describing the trial court found defendant competent because she had been found competent on prior
occasions, despite current testimony and evaluation indicating she was not currently competent); State v.
Montoya, 2010-NMCA-067, 238 P.3d 369 (trial court judge did not consider present question of
competency when defendant had been found competent to stand trial at the during the preliminary hearing
stage); Flores, 2005-NMCA-135 (finding of competency ten months earlier was deemed adequate to
determine present competency).
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of competency and trial, and this will not be a continuing issue. However, for clarity,
and to be consistent with case law, the proposed rule should state that the remedy for
a concern about stale information is a new evaluation.234
Furthermore, the proposed rule does not provide guidance about what a trial
court should do with an evaluation other than the one ordered by the court or if there
are multiple evaluations. The proposed rule appears to only contemplate a court
ordered evaluation, and like the current rule, it “neither permits nor prohibits
additional evaluations.”235 One suggestion is that the rule could require that all
evaluations be performed by the court’s expert. If all evaluations were performed by
court appointed evaluators, non-indigent defendants would be required to pay, which
could help provide funding to hire more evaluators.
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court seeks to provide improvements to the
current procedures for determining competence to stand trial by revising the rules.
Change is clearly necessary, particularly because defendants who raise competency
too often languish in jail for disproportionately long periods of time before guilt or
innocent has been determined. Though it is unlikely that any rule will fully
accommodate all of the competing interests that are implicated when competence to
stand trial is raised, the attempt must be made to provide practical compromises that
will ensure that defendants’ due process rights are protected and the goals of the
criminal justice system are met. Many dedicated and committed lawyers, advocates,
and judges struggle with complex problems that arise when a defendant’s
competency is raised, and hopefully they will take the opportunity to read and
comment on the next revision to the proposed rule so that the Committee can adjust
the rule to best address the myriad concerns—including reducing the extended
pretrial detention of defendants who raise competency.

234. Castillo, No. 31054, 2013 WL 5310262, ¶ 12.
235. Linares, 2017-NMSC-014, ¶ 27.

